Wrong on Humanity: Prevention of Crimes against Humanity, A   Anniversary Contributions - International Criminal Law by Crane, David M.
A WRONG ON HUMANITY: PREVENTION OF 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
-l. lNTRODUCTl()i\: 
The history of mankind is the history of vvar. Throughout 
history man has so ught to dominate and control his fellnw man. 
Vwriou5 religious texts are replete with w.1r, conflict, strife, c1Lrocity, 
and su fferins. For millenn ia, there was little to no 8tternpl to limit 
the effect of interna t ional or intern,ll conflict upon civilian 
populations. C ivili2'1ns became the grisl i n  the war machine. 
Even now, as of fall 2008, civilians <m:� suffering in the 
DeniC•cr;;ltic Republic of the Congo as rebe l and governmental 
forces, WC\tched by a hapless United Ne�tions, vie for control of the 
eastern portion of the country and its resources. I ron ica lly, one 
hundred years clgo, Joseph Conrad wrote �l bOu l atrocity in the 
Belgian Congo, as one of the main characters in Heart of Dc1rli/less 
dies lcunenting, "[t]he horror, the horror!"1 
It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that C1llempts were 
made to a meliora te the sting of battle and to pn'1tect civilians, tJ1e 
wounded, the sick, and prisoners. From the beginning of the Red 
Cross Movement launched by Henri Duncmt, throu gh the Hague 
Conventions of 1907, to the Genev<'l Conventions of 1949, the 
cornerstone of various standards and protections had been laid. 
This Article will review the past and considc·r whether a path 
tuwCltds preventing atrocity ("crimes agC� inst humanity" F hns 
· l'rlltl'�S0r, Syracuse University Collt.:ge uf Lc1\\' and founding Chief 
Pro�t'Cutor \)f the international war crimes tribunal in West Africa call ed the 
Spcci,1l Cou rt for Sierra Lt>onc, 2001-2005. 
' JOSFI•H CONR,\0, 1-lE.\IHGF Ot\RK1\:ESS86 (Ross C i'vlurfin ed., Be�Hord BPoks, 
2d ed. 1996) (1902). 
2 Sc'L' Theodun� Rooscwlt. Wnsllingtnn':; Ftll'gottcn t\'laxilll, i11 B THE \Vui\KS m 
THFCIPOI<I' Rou:-.F\'EI.T 18:2, lS-1-185 (Charles Scribner's Sons 192fi) (dl.'scribing the 
exlrcmdv violent ch,w,1ctcristics of crimes against hum<1r1ity); �<'t' nl�n Gr\fn J. BASS. 
Fi<l+fiC1\i'S B,\TTLE: THI:. 0R!ClNS OF HUMANIIARI.-\•\" lNi'EINF�riOl\: 328 (2008) 
(reterring to RL'It',se\·elt's desc ription of brutal examples of crimes against 
humanity). 
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already begun . .3 Fronl. there, I will discuss the present and question 
whether this is the beginning of the end of atrocity. Finally, f w ill 
look to the future and think about a new rnodel of prevent ion, as 
opposed to today' s reactive paradigm. 
2. THE PAST-A PATHWAY TO PREVE�TION BEGINS? 
Ollle of mankind's bloodiest centuries began vvith the jCJint 
economic enterprise between the Congo and King Leopold of 
Belgium, which saw the destruction of between eight to ten million 
human beings. From Leopold to the Three Pashas, to Stalin, Hitler, 
and Mao; through to Amin, Milosevic, Hussein, and Taylor; over 
100 r1:1illion people have died at the hands of their own 
governments. 
Little was done at first. Leopold was adn10nished and publicly 
shamed. The Three Pashas and their cohorts were brought before 
various courts or were assassinated by Armenians bent on revenge. 
The world was unaware of the kill ing machine developed by 
Joseph Stalin during the formative years of the Soviet Union, and it 
was only at the end of the Second World War that the full extent of 
Hitler's holocaust was realized:* 
At the end of the darkness of World War Il, a brief period of 
hope shone its tentative light towards accountability and justice. 
Mankind paused for a period of four years and developed what 
vvas to become a cornerstone for modern i nternational criminal law 
five decades later in the form of a new tribunal and a series of 
charters, declarations, and conventions . 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was one of 
humanity's first efforts to hold tyrants accountable under the rule 
of law. The results, though ridiculed at the time, became the 
1 uremberg Principles, which helped shape modern jurisprudence 
for atrocity .s 
During the historic trials before the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, the nations of the vvorld assembled and 
3 The Author 1-vill usc the term "atrocity" rather th<�n "crimes ag<�inst 
humani:ty," as the Article is looking at a model that prevents international crimes 
in generCJI. 
·1 Sec �e11ernlly R. J. RU!'-..1MEL, DEATH BY GOVERNi\.1E:--JT (1994) (discussing the 
Cltrocities committed by governments against their own citizens). 
5 See Prillciple::. of lnternntionnl Lnw Recog11ized in file Clwrter of tl1e Niimucrg 
Tribunal and i11 tile Judgment of tile Tribunal, 2 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n 30, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.4/1950 (providing the official text adopted hy the International Law 
Commission at its second session and submitted to the General Assembly). 
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drafted the United Nc"llions Charter. Based on the concept of 
i nterna tional peace and security through the nonviolent resolution 
of disputes, the United Nations looked to the rule of law and not to 
the rule of the gun as the centerpiece to world order.�> 
For millennit1, a humcln being, save for a few brief periods1 hnd 
little if r.my ind ividual rigbts. However, with the advent of the 
Universe1l Declaration of Humcll1 R i ghts, the international 
commu nity st,�ted that every hurncm born has <'\ right to exist on 
this planet.' This was tollowed by the Genoci de Convention, 
which sought to hold nccountable those vvho would violate that 
right to ex ist by exterminating whole peoples, soc iet ies , and 
cuI tures.� 
Throughout the advent of modern industrial warfare, nations 
beg<H1 to put i1.1 writing the customs of international law related to 
the treatment of prisoners, the sick and wounded, as well as 
civilians. Starting with the work of Uenri Dunant, a Swiss citizen 
who began the Red Cross movement, the i n ternational community 
established rules to govern warfme on lc1nd and sea. 
At first, this framework was estabJished to control the types of 
weapons used in wJrfare and the types of p laces and persons to be 
targeted. Concepts surh as proportionality, Ll!Ulecessary suffering, 
and m.ilitary necessity were qtw n tified and used as the method to 
control combat a.nd keep i t  as civilized as possible . Known as the 
Hague Rules., these important principles established the 
underpinnings of what would be cc1lled the laws of armed confl ict 
cmd international humanitarian Jaw." 
lt vvas only in  1949 that lhese various laws of armed conflict 
wc.re codifi ed into the Geneva Conventions. Four Conventions 
were created lo address the trentment of lhe wounded and sick on 
land Clnd sea, prisoners oi war, .:md ci vilians.JO Common Article 3, 
�> SL'C U.N. C:h,1rter Mt. J, p<trn. 1 (introducing the U.N. charter '-'Vith its 
princi�1les, pt1rposes, procedures, c�nd gt>neral guiding policies). 
I Sec Ullivcr�;(l( Oech:m1lion ot Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., l..,'.N. Doc. A/HlO (Dec. 11, '1948) (declaring th�:: human 
right� that i!pply tn <�II �'t'llpit'). 
' See Con veption on the rn,.,·ention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocidt>, Dec. 9, 1940, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 2t)5 Consol. T.S. 277 (establishing thC> 
prindples ,wd pnKedur�s gPVL·rnil�t-:. lh� cri1\1e of genocide). 
'J St:r.> Hagu� Convention l�cspccting the 1,.1\VS and Customs of Wat on L<md, 
Oct. ·tB, I 907, 31) Stat. 2"277 (listing !;igning pMties to the convention and its 
principles). 
Ill Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, '194-9, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
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included in atl four, established thol the minimu rn treatment for 
anvone found on a batlle(ield was llll/l'lr11lt! trent111enl, re garcl lcss of 
-' ,, 
their status . These Conventions also stated that those who violated 
or bre,Khed these rules were to be punished by the various state 
parties to that Convenlion.1' The standard for �uch a breach was to 
investiga tc, prosecute, and punish or turn over the alleged 
perpeLrators lo a signatory nation that was willing to take the 
responsibility.12 This vvas revolution<uy thinking <md theoretically 
changed the shape and tenor of co mbat and weapons 
development. 
Tragically, after thesE:> (our groundbreaking years, the Cold War 
consumed the world c1S the two superpowers held each other by 
the throat, in a death grip called mutually assure>d destruction. 
Both the West and the Soviet Bloc allied themselves with anv 
nation or tyrant as long as they etgreed ideologically with that side. 
Tb[s dance with the dev[l set the stCige for the rest of the bloody 
twentieth century. Most of the dee� ths perpetrated by one's own 
government took place during the Cold \Nar. Bodies floated down 
the Yellow River in China by the tens of thousands or were buried 
in the killing fields of Cambodia. 
3. THE PRESENT-THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
TO A TROCJTY? 
Despite early efforts to garner support £or an international 
court lo address international crimes, it was not until the break up 
of the former Yugoslavia, and the consequent destruction of 
civilians and their property, that the world paused. to take stock of 
Lhe.ir approach to the ravages of internal armed conflict. 
The result was the. first serious effort since Nuremberg to hold 
<lCCOlmla ble those who preyed upon their fellow citizens. The 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; GcnevJ Conv""nlion for the Amclior<1tion of 
the Cnndit ion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members oi thl! Armed Forces 
i1tSea, ALtg. '1:2, l9L!9, 6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.I\.T.S. oS [hL•rein,lfter Cenev::l Convention 
l!j; Gt?nev<l Convention Hel<�tive to the fre::1tment of Prisoners l'f WM, 1\ug. 12, 
19'-19, 6 US.T� 3316, 75 U.NTS 135 [hereinafter Genev<l Convention lllj; Genevil 
Com en lion Rt•lcltivc to the Prot�ction of Civili,1n Persons in rime of W.u, 1\ug. 12. 
19.J9, 6 US�T. 3516, 75 U.[\l.T.S. 287 lhereinaftt..'r Genc\'<1 Convention lVJ. 
li Sec Geneva Convention l, supm twlc IU, ,1rL ..J.9 (deloiling repression uf 
<lbuses a1Kl infractions); Cenevil Cmvt:ntion II, supra note �10, ::1rt. 50 (same); 
Cenc\'rt Convention IJ I, supra note 10, art. J 29 (sn rne); Geneva Convention I \1, 
supra note ·10, art. 146 (same). 
12 See ��.g., Geneva Convention 1, s11pn1 nole LO, art. 49 (noting that contracting 
parties must take all "measures necessary" to prevent grave breaches). 
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creation of the [n lernational Criminal TribunJ I ior the FoTiner 
Yugoslavi� (" ICTY") was a difficult biTth, bul the result was the 
beginning of m<mkind's attempt to rein in atrocityY· 
Within <1 )'l'clr of the creation of the ICTY, the Hutu majority in 
Rwanda began to systematically chop, cut, and destroy the Tutsi 
minority and those vvho were associated with t hem. Il was an 
i\trocitv the likes of which had not been seen since World War l[, 
with up to 10,000 people dying every day. AL first, the world 
looked the other wCiy, sitting on its hnncts while the bodies piled up 
in Lhat idyll ic p!Cice. Yet even the IT\Ost cyniccll United Nations 
nfficicd could not rcmC�in complucent. Once ClgC�in, the internationc'll 
com.mun ity stepped up to the plct te and crec1Led thL' next tribu nal of 
the modt'rn ere:1, the Jnternational Cri111inal Tribunal for RwCinda 
("ICTR").l.l Hec1clcd by the Chief Prosecutor ell the ICTY in The 
Hague, the lCTR stumbled forward in an atten1pt to account for 
the killings in Rwanda. 
L 
'TI1e 1990s saw i mportC'Int jurisprudence coming out of the two 
t1d hoc tribunC�Is, as they came to be called. This jurisprudence 
pCivcd the vvay for further attempts to seek justice for victims of 
atrocity. Early on, the bedrock princip les in interna tional law 
related to bead of state im munity, a ITtajor legal lnn·dle to holding 
heads of state accountable for crimes against their own people, 
began to CTack and soften.Is During this time frame, the associated 
offenses surrounding war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide were lit igated in Rwanda. 
As the two ad hoc tribuna ls investigated, indicted, and 
prosecuted those who were responsible for war cri.mes, crimes 
agajnst hu mC�niLy, and genocide, a joint crim.inztl enterprise in West 
Africa was destroying several countries, by fom.entlng, and then 
aiding and Clbetting, a ten-year long civil war in Sierra Leone. Over 
time, over ] .2 million human beings were murdered, mped, 
JT121imed, <�nd mutilated, with over 2.5 rnillion Sierra Leoneans 
interned ly displc1ced. Sierra Leone was left to fend for itself, the 
1:• Set• S.C [{6. 827, U.N. Doc. S/l{ES/827 (iVIny 25, 1993) (establishing <m 
inr�m.1ti(ln,1l crimincll tribunnl with the purpose of stoppin� lht' violence and 
hunMnitarian crisis within the former Yugoslavi;:J). 
it Sec S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (�uv. Cl, ·!99-t) (reCicting to the 
hunwn itari;m crisis \·Vithin Rwandil by creating the lnt�:•rn<ltional Criminal 
fribune1l for I{I·Vclnda). 
15 Thi::: tvpe of immunitv deri,·es from customary international law and 
affords heads of state immunity from crimimll charges wbile serving in office. 
The immuniry terminates, however, once the officiallea\'es office. 
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world lookl·d away, for tht:: most pcwt, to the destruction of an 
�nbre region of the world. 
It was only after the sitting Prt"side.nt of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone sent n letter to then Secrdarv-Gcncral of the United NJtions 
Kofi Annan, did the international community pause long enough 
to consider what action to tc1ke. Because Sierra Leone could not 
account for the multiple international crimes committed lhL'rc, lhe 
President needed help, cllld fciSL Though it took another two years, 
the world's first hybrid intt:'rnationnl war crimes tribun;:li wriS 
estnblished, Gil led the Speci,1! Court for Sierra Leone.16 
The United N2iticii1S t()Ok this new concept and, combined with 
what had been le0 rned over the past several years from the ad hoc 
tribune1ls, gave this Jll'\.V c0urt a signiii.canl and wor ka ble m.clndatt: 
to prosecute those "persons who bear the greatest responsibility.''L­
This was the great politiccd compromise that allowed for the 
creation of this new justice mechanism and llighlighted the rc.:al­
world approach to in personem jurisdiction, holding nccount,lble 
only those who started, aided, t:�betted, and suste1ined the conflict. 
The number of potential indictees droppe d from hundreds to 
thirteen. This was an .xhicvable mandnte, one that could be 
accomplished efficiently, effectively, and within a politically 
acceptable time frame . The international comm unity now he1d 
another "tool in lht' kit bag" in facing down impunity . 
The 1990s savv amazing e1nd almost inconceivable advancement 
in intern ational criminJI law. By 1998, the Rome Statute was 
signed creating a perrnanent internationaJ crim inC'l l court based in 
The Haguc. 18 The fntemational Criminal Court (''ICC") was up 
2md running by 2003 and will be the basis f or prosecuting those 
who bear lhe greatesl respon::oibility for committing the m ost 
serious of international crimes throughout this century . 
While this m ovement iorword focused on present and future 
atrocitv, another v<lriettion on the hybrid the me was created to 
' -
account for past <ltrncity in the killing fields of Ce1mbodiC1 . The 
Extraordinary Ch<lmbcrs in the Courts of Cambodia WCIS cl1<:rged 
!�> �cc S.C. r\es. 131.5, C.�. Uoc. �/RES/1315 (Aug. 1-t 2000) (rl:'spundilt� tt' 
the grCiv� situ<1tion within SieiT<l l.eone by establishing the special C.:1 • .lll l'l). 
17 Id. art. 1, po1ra. 1. 
IS Rome St3tute of Lhe International Criminal Court, July ·17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF:IS3/9. 
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with investigating and prosecuting the surviving rnem.bers of the 
junta who ruled Cambodia in the n1id 1970s.1() 
These various methodologies that addressed the international 
crimes committed in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia revealed thC�t the past was a catalyst for the atrocity 
committed in the modern era. While the Cold VVar made for 
strange bedfellows C�nd odd political alli.ances that suppressed 
century-old hatreds, only to erupt with the fall of the Soviet empire 
and the symbolic "wall/' it was coionialism and the arbitrary 
carving up of whole continents that laid the seed bed for atrocity, 
especially in places such as Africa. 
In the 1950s cmd 1960s, colonies began to achieve their 
independence. These new nations were n1odeled on the 
democratic fonTIS of government formerly imposed upon them, in 
some instances, as a condition for independence vvith a hope that 
they would align themselves with the West. [n many instances, 
this independence spawned weal< governmental structures. In 
places where democracy was a foreign concept, the former 
colonies, over tin1e, reverted to cultural defaults to govern 
themselves. Dominant tribes began to claim exclusive control. 
This resulted in bad governance principles and tribal tension. 
Corruption became a problem that further fueled frustration and 
unrest over the next several decades. With this societal unrest 
came the potential for atrocity, which exists to this day, and has 
been the root cause of atrocity in places such as Sierra Leone. 
4. THE FUTURE-COMMUNITY AWARENESS, DIPLOMATIC, AND 
WORLD ORDER METHODS OF PREVEI\'TION 
Despite the steps forward in accountability mechanisms today, 
it is in1portant to p<'mse and consider commonalities in the causes 
of atrocity over the past century before we consider the future 
prevention of crin1es against humanity. 
I recall giving my opening statem.ent at the Joint Criminal Trial 
against the Civil Defense Force in June of 2004 in the Trial 
Chamber One of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where I quoted 
19 Sec Draft Agreement Between the United N,1tions and the Royal 
Government of Cm11bodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodi<m Lav.- of 
Crirnes Committed during the Period of Democratic K«rnpuchea, G.A. Res. 57, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES 57 /228B/ Annex (lvlay 22, 2003) (describing the role of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in prosecuting those responsible for the atrocity in 
Cambodia). 
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a Jewish freedom fighter trapped in the War�aw Ghetto during 
World VVar 11. The freedom figh ter had written the World Jewish 
Council in New York, stating: ''They are kill ing us all! Believe the 
unbelievable." Disbelief ·was a comrnon initial reaction to atrocity 
in the !twentieth century. From the Congo to th e Holocm1st, 
n:.·•Ktlon bv the international community was one of disbelief or - -
skepticism regarding the information being reported at the time 
,1bout ;:111 G trocity. This was the bit;gesl threat to any action. 
Regimes cloak their actions in several layers from domestic 
l.:l\\·, nat.iormlisn1, and external threat (vvhat 1 call the "boogcy man 
concept'"). To counter this threat, real or perc<:.·ived, the atrocity 
evolves into a plan or schernc to counter the threat to the 
sovercig�nty of the en1.pire or na tion. One sees stereotyping of the 
t<1rgetedl peoples, use of mass medi<1, and prop.:1gandc1 to create the 
perception of thre<1t and the dire CLmsequences if not dealt with by 
th� regime or government. Additionally, religious bias is injected 
to fan the flames, as well CIS to Justify gove rnmen lal action. 
As the atrocity unfolds, the internationt�l comnnmity is 
informed through med1a, at first by newspapers outside the aree� or 
by activists speaking out and voicing their concern, For example, 
public interest in the atrocity ollgoing in the Belgian Congo \Na.s 
sust<"lined by the fmnous wr.itcrs of the time, such as Mark Twain, 
Joseph Conrad, or Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Even today, atrocity is 
made known by independent media sources. In some ways, the 
hOLtrly news cycle of global cable television alert and sustain public 
avvaren<�ss withjn hours of the events, and i.n some cases, as it is 
huppelTing. It is becoming increasingly hard for strong centralized 
regirncs to begin to destroy a people without it being known 
quickly by CNN, the BBC, or other media outlets. 
To s um marize what the past reveals, when we see a nation�slnte 
regc1rdlcss if jt was a colony or not (thcugh being a former colony 
should be t1 red flag), with a strung centmliz.ed governm ent, headed 
by a slrongllln/1 with years in power, who begins to identify u 
people within thC:1t country t:lu·ough stereotypi11g and public mediCI 
pronoLnKcments that they are an internal threut to the security of 
the country (or likewise identify an ethnic group 01 a political 
entity outside the cou n try as a threat-the boogeyma n), and begins 
to use domestic law, as well as relig ious pronouncements to juslify 
p1.)ssibl�? action; t/u:n the internl:lhona1 communily should sit up and 
take notice. An atrocity is about to l1appen. History tells us that 
this is so. Look to the Congo, Turkey, the Soviet Union, China, 
Cambodia, the Balkans, Rwanda, Iraq, and Darfur, to name a few. 
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As the twenty-first century evolves, wru-fare is chdnging. In 
part, this phenomenon is due to globalization Clnd the decJine of 
the n8tion-state as tl1c center of power to n center of �·ower, where 
the nation-state shares that power with muiti-national 
corporations, interm1tional CTi .minal ca.rtels, terrorists, as well as 
other non-state. actors and organizations, including civil society 
and NGOs. 
This century \NiLl see a new age of contl ict thclt wi l l  be less 
na tional in scope and more regional. Cornbatdnts 1.v i l i  be less 
l egitima te and are becoming i11cree�singly criminal in their n-:otivcs 
and actions. fhc k�y players in Lhis conflict wili  be n<.,n-slate 
actors, iJ1 some instances C1cting as surrogates tor states themselves. 
Sadly, as in the pasl centuries, civilians, particularly women cmd 
child ren, wil l  bce�r the brun t of the crime perpetrclt�d in these 
conflicts. 
Additionally, conflicts a.re evolving a.nd are becoming 
uncivilized. Despite the horror of the twentieth century, at least 
the rise of international humanitarian law saw attempts to inject 
the rule of law onto the battlefield. As states become surrogates or 
are less involved jn warfare, the advances in this area are 
threatened. Respect .for the laws of armed conflict is dimin ishing, 
as the combatants to the conflict become mere pawns in a deCidly 
game for power driven by greed and control. joint criminal 
enterprises, whose m,otives are economic or criminal( wi l l  be a 
basis for combat, rather than the more traditional rationa les for 
war. 
l n  light of this apparent new paradigm shift in power and in 
the wRy conflict is evolving, along with what we have learned from 
the past in how atrocity develops, as well as the new justice 
mechanisms in place to deal with a n  atrocity committed in a 
conflict, let us now consider ways the international communitv 
may prevent a trocity. 
Using the genera l commonalities stemming from past atrocity 
d iscussed C1bove, Figure 9 now lays out the indicative model of 
possible ntrocity. A fter considering this, we will Lhen turn to ways 
to prevent 2m atrocity from happening rather than reacting to 
atrocity that /ws happened. This preventative concept is shovvn in 
Figure "JO. 
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Preventing Atrocity (crimes against humanity) 
A Government The indicators ... 
\ 
That is iv1ulticuitural 
w;th -• \!Vnere there is 
Econcm!c Dispari!y 
Po! tcal :mbata'lc:: 
Corruption 
and/or 
Lack of Good 
Governance 
and/or 
Cultural Disparity 
FIGURE 9 
Potential for 
• Atrocity 
To this point, we have first placed i n  historical context crimes 
against humanity in l ight of reacti011 by governments. Second, we 
have considered the present and the new mechanisms that have 
been p u t  i n to place to account for these crimes, and third, we have 
considered past indicators o.f international crimes. 
As we review the n10del found at Figure 9, we have to ask 
omselves some questions. First, is the type of government an 
indicator? Second, do the indicators change i f  it is  a homogenous 
society vvith only one culture or religion in the country? Third, 
how import21nt are the attributes of good governance and the rule 
of law? Can there be an atrocity committed by a society or nation 
that follows the ru le  of law? These key questions are outside the 
scope of th is  Article, but it is safe to conclude that they probably do 
shape the potenti21l for a trocity one way or the other. An 
interesting question to reflect upon is: Could. a largely ho111ogenous 
democracy that has a tradition of followillg tl1e rule of lmo witlz lllininll71 
cornwtion co11unit atrocittj? 
I ' 
The mirror to this question is highlighted i n  Figure 9. This 
model states that a govemment that is multicultural with ecouo111ic 
disparity nnd/or 11 political i111balance, is corrupt and/or lias bad 
govemance, nnd cultuml disparity may be a governme11t/nation that can 
commit all atrocity. The model suggested allows the international 
community to develop or refine 21 list of potential atrocity flash 
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points that can be rnonitored. This wil l  allovv for preventive 
measures to be considered and taken to cut off thCit potential 
atrocity. For example, each of the factors listed are indicators, 
which when removed from this cumulative model may din1inish 
the possibility of a future atrocity. That is why the questions posed 
are so important. lf one believes that a stable democracy, with the 
usual Western traditions of rule of law and good governance, can 
commit atrocity, even crimes against huma n i ty, then the proffered 
model weakens, and the hope of prevention of i n ternational crimes 
almost becomes as futi le as if there is no model upon which we can 
build the rule of law t1nd accountability.�o 
However, if one believes or assumes the contrary, then the 
model in Figure 9 gives us a way to understand the point at which 
international, regional or local efforts can help prevent atrocity. It 
remains to be seen, hovvever, whether current global economic 
unrest and the long term. outlook for the environment and energy 
supply will  negate efforts as nations look inward to their own 
survival. Are we entering an even bloodier centu.ry of survival 
that will supersede the previous one in its horror? 
Figure 10 is a possible prevention model that stems from the 
indicators .found in Figure 9. The prevention keys are: (1) 
IIIOi zitoring identified states and regions; (2) understanding the above 
mentioned indicators; and (3) responding to the indicators 
constructively over time to lessen the chances that an atrocity wil l  
occur. An in1portant attribute is that  it  can be done fairly 
e.f.ficiently. I t  w i l l  be less costly to minimize or remove the various 
indicators sooner rather than later, when the indicators are more 
endemic and pervasive. I n  n.1any regions of the world, this may 
already be the case. 
By identifying states or regions with potential for atrocity, the 
i n ternational con1munity could entrust or give mandates to 
regional organizations or even U n i ted Nations entities to oversee 
these indicators. These entities would be responsible for 
h i ghlighting those ind icators to local states and urging action 
through various economic or societal reforms bolstered by various 
incentives. Additionally, ongoing efforts must be made by 
20 There is certainly something to be said about the "ckrnocratic peace" 
paradigm when considering all of this. However, in light of policies implemented 
by the Bush adm.inistration in fighting the "global war on terror" over the past 
several years, the answer to the question posed may be " yes." In real or perceived 
extreme times the moral and legal fiber of a nation is tested indeed. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
"1276 U. Po. f. lnt'l L. [VoL 30:4 
in ternational and local governments, civit  society, and NGOs to 
educate themselves, local societies, cultures/ e1nd citizens in 
understanding these indicators. They should work to create 
\'a rious channels to report the indicators and <1ny other signs of a 
government preparing to commit an atrocity.2 1 
When indicators reveal the potential for an c1 trocity, responses 
at various levels should be tr iggered , starting at the softer 
e�pproacb of d iplomacy and gr<1du ally moving to more l"lardened 
sanctions, in order to politically and prclCl ically prevent any further 
steps towc:�rd Cl human tragedy. Only later should sanctions be 
cons idered to further pTevent the steps from happen ing ag<�in. In 
some ways, much of this- the commonalities of the potential for 
an atrocity, the indica tors, as well as the prevention of alTocity - is 
conceptually cyclic in nature und overlaps with the other. 
RegMdlcss, the concept of ntOI!i furiug, undcrstouding, and respo11ding 
to the ind icators may be a way of preven ting crimes against 
human i ty and othe1' international crimes. 
Preventing Atrocity (Crimes Against Humanity) 
International monitoring . 
Regional oversighl 
Local action. 
\ Respond! Economically 
Monitor Diplomatically 
Understand Socially/culturally 
Respond Legally 
flCURE 1 0  
Understand the indicators. 
Educate citizens. NGO's, ciVil 
sodety, governments. 
Report events. 
Sandions 
: 1  Most atrocities share some conunonlalities in their inception; there is  initiaJ 
apathy or disbelief of the government, role of religion or law as justffic<ltion for 
action, steryotyping of a population segrnent as outsiders, etc. 
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5. CONCLUSION - A  GLOBAL RESPONSlBIUT� TO PROTECr 
l 277 
The prevention model found in  Figure 10 :.1bove fits into the 
emerging doctrine of the responsibility to protect (" R2P"). R2P 
contemplates preventive measures by placing a duty 011 oil :::taft.'S to 
protect their ovvn citi/..ens from atTOcity. This d ut\' is a conccptu:.ll 
standc1rd that in ternc1t ione1l and regio nal orgaruzation::; Ctlll usc to 
monitor domestic act ivity and educate a s tate and ib citizens. At 
the same timc1 i t  pr(lvides a mechanism to prevent the ind icotors 
frnm progressing into an atrocity and to sanction a rei uct,lnt �.t<ltc 
should that be necessary. The schematic in Figure 1 1  below shows 
where the prevention model assists in enforcin g thL' respunsibility 
t0 protect one's own ci tizens from possible atn•city by a 
government.:!� This principle of R2P reflec ts <l preventi ve 
complcn1ent to a history of reactive, albeit necessary, justice. 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
The Continuum Model 
David M. Cr:>ne 
SEVERITY OF 
CIRCUMSTANCE -• International lnte")aticl)a/ Arrr>ud Conffa 
SITUATION 
Domestic 
l'latural 
Noo ·mtemerfonal 
;.,medCon!IIGt 
lnsuf!lency / 
Regional 
d!SD;tcr Rx.1l 
/ 
R2P 
C;vl 
d\Stumance Domestic 
�· R2P is a brght linc obliga tlot' 
thr1t runs thc ugh domesuc:. r&C)ional and 
lntemau:>MI ci:eum:;;an::es. Or.�/ the level 
or reac:<>n and lllspoi)So cllanses with lila: 
cm::ums1anca. The rl' .. �t�.l::m se rs bus eo on fegpl. 1reaty. arto pra�ttal etitena ;c, tr.e. shuatioo., 
FIGURE 1 1  
• R2P 
International 
R.ESPONSE/ 
REACTiON 
Po tr�caJ 
Prac:"'"l 
:1 Antonio C<1ssese �'s�entially nott::s this in  his textbook. .St'c AI'-.IONIO 
C'A�5ES[, I � I ERN/\TIONc\l CRtt-.!INAI L•\W 64 (2003) ("[ljt 111.1:' bL• fitting tu lll'(Q that 
to <1 large exknt m<�ny concepls unckrlving this Ct'lh.:gt1ry of crimes fcrimL'::. c1g,1inst 
hu111G1nityj dt!rivc from, or nvcrlap with, those of hurnan right i,1\\' (th(! righr to 
life, not to be tortured, tt> liberty and security of person) . . . .''). It  is submitted 
that human rights law imposes the R2P duty on governrnents to protect and care 
for their citizens in accordance witb various human rights instruments, e.g. thi:! 
Unfvers<1l Decl<Jraiion of Human Rights. 
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Figure 1 2  places thut responsibility to protect in the prevention 
model posed cMlier and reflects how preventing atrocity (such <"�S 
crimes against h u rnanity), using the monitoring, u nderstanding, 
�nd responding method suggested cnn assist in that duty· lo 
protect. This model supports the basic premise of the duty 
inherent in R2P, which is protection from Elbuse and the moral and 
legal basis for internation<1l intervention if necessary. I t  places tbe 
burden of protection squarely on the shoulders of states. 
Preventing Atrocity (Crimes Against Humanity) ... 
\ 
Monitor 
understand 
Respond 
---------
--- ·-
R2P 
-� 
Respond' 
Ecnnomicalty 
Otplomaticaliy 
Soctally/culltJrolly 
Legally 
FIGURE 12 
Understand the: tndicaloiS. 
Educate citizens. NGO"s, ci\�1 
society. governments. 
Report events. 
SanCtions 
In conclusion, the bright red threCld that weaves ils way 
thJoughout our discussion is politics. Regardless of the moral and 
legc1l basis fnr prevention of international crimes1 the political wil l  
of  n.1tions, regional, tllld i nternationc�l organizations ec-mnot be 
ignored. As mankind moves ha !tingly into lhis new century new 
questions emerge, such as: l s  the United Nations par.:�digm 
capable of preventing these ,.::rin1.es or even capable of 
administering justice? Efficiency und effectiveness are problems 
foLmd in tht: vnrious courts and tribunr1ls. 
Other concerns revolve around further questions. Is the jt1stice 
the intern;:Jtional community seeks the justice the victims \1\'llnl? 
There ar� cCt'tJ illl)' concerns, as well, related to the responsibility h> 
protect EJS a pretext to interventions into other states for more 
cynical purposes other thcln h urnanitarian reasons. Is R2P even 
workable? 
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Despite a l l  these potential issues, prevention is less expensive 
than retroactive action, c1nd w i L l  save lives. One can ren1.a in  
optintistic and certainly bopefu I that our new century just may be 
the beginning of the end to atrocity. I t  remains to be seen. 
President Woodrow Wilson declared in a speech at Mount 
Vernon in July of 1918: "WhCit \NC seek is the reign of law, based 
upon the consent of the governed, and sustai.ned by the organized 
opinion of mankind.":!:� 
23 See WOOD!{OW WILSO:-.J, Tile League 4 Natiou:::, in WiLSON'S lDEALS 96 (Saul K. 
Padover ed., 1942) (setting forth principles for <1 League of 1 ations). 
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